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Abstract. Today, cyber threats have the potential to harm critical infrastructures which may 
result in the interruption of life-sustaining services, catastrophic economic damages or severe 
degradation of national security. The diversity and complexity of cyber threats that exploit the 
vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures increase every day. . In order to lessen the potential harm 
of cyber threats, countermeasures have to be applied and the effectiveness of these 
countermeasures has to be monitored continuously. In this study, a brief definition and history of 
critical infrastructures are introduced. Cyber threats are examined in four fundamental 
categories. Vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures are categorized and examined. Finally, 
countermeasures that may play a key role in critical infrastructure protection programs are 
categorized.  
1. Introduction 
Critical infrastructures are those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum 
operations of the economy and the government.1 Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) is an 
important program in which governments have to take action in order to cope with cyber threats. 
The first formal document that uses the term "critical infrastructure" dates back to 15 July 1996, 
which is an executive order signed by the U.S. president.2 Physical threats and 'cyber threats' are 
stated as two major threat types in this executive order. The purpose of the executive order is to 
set forth the basic steps of CIP.  
 
1 The White House, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63 at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-63.htm 
(accessed 12 June 2012) 
2 Presidential Executive Order 13010, Critical Infrastructure Protection, p. 3. 
According to the Presidential Decision Directive, many of the critical infrastructures have 
historically been physically and logically separate systems that had little interdependence. As a 
result of advances in information technology and the necessity of improved efficiency, however, 
these infrastructures have become increasingly automated and interlinked.3 Therefore, it is 
important to note that the term of “critical infrastructure protection” was proposed after the 
widespread use of information technologies in these infrastructures. Critical infrastructures and 
information technologies have strong relationships in many different ways and levels.4   
Cyber threats are evolving with each passing day. Almost every week, a new cyber incident 
appears in the media. Cyber threats are asymmetric in nature.5 They can harm critical 
infrastructures in great extent by making minor cyber operations. In this paper, cyber threats 
against critical infrastructures are tried to be categorized. The vulnerabilities of critical 
infrastructures are defined. The countermeasures for the resulting risks are categorized and listed.  
2. Strategies to Counter Cyber Attacks 
In this part of the paper, cyber assets, cyber threats, vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures and 
countermeasures are explained in the following four subsections respectively.  
2.1 Cyber Assets: Critical Infrastructures 
Today, almost all critical sectors use cyber systems. Transportation, banking and finance, health 
and emergency, defense sectors and vital government facilities use conventional information 
technologies. Telecommunications sector is also a critical infrastructure and it is entirely 
composed of information technologies.6 Some of the critical sectors are controlled and monitored 
 
3 The White House, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63 at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-63.htm 
(accessed 12 June 2012) 
4 Jayawickrama, "Managing Critical Information Infrastructure Security Compliance: A Standard Based Approach 
Using ISO/IEC 17799 and 27001" p. 563. 
5 Kshetri, "Information and communications technologies, strategic asymmetry and national security" p. 564. 
6 Beltran, “Internet as a critical infrastructure: lessons from the backbone experience in South America”, p. 1. 
by SCADA systems, which are specially crafted software and equipment. SCADA stands for 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition. Energy, water and critical manufacturing are key 
sectors that use SCADA systems.  
In the 70s, 80s and even in the 90s, SCADA systems were legacy systems. They composed of 
exotic, proprietary and even obscure hardware and software. The SCADA systems were almost 
unique to the specific infrastructure. SCADA systems were isolated as well. There were no 
access to corporate networks and the Internet. In those days, there was no Internet in fact.  
Today, SCADA systems use open international standards for most of the operations. They use 
standard hardware, software, operating systems, and protocols. SCADA systems make use of 
COTS (Commercial off the shelf) products in most cases. Today, SCADA systems are well 
documented as well. Finally, SCADA systems are connected to corporate networks and even to 
the Internet by wired or wireless means.7 Therefore, energy and water industries may be exposed 
to cyber threats directly. 
In general, almost all of the critical sectors are connected to the Internet. Although Internet is a 
physically distributed infrastructure, it is logically unified. In this unique logical infrastructure, 
we live with cyber threats like cyber attacks, cyber criminals and cyber spies. In the next 
subsection, cyber threats are elucidated in four categories.  
2.2 Cyber Threats 
Cyber threats can be categorized in four main groups.8 These groups are hacktivism, cyber 
crime, cyber espionage and cyber war. However there is no clear-cut distinction among these 
groups as shown in Figure-1. These categorized cyber threats can intersect with each other in 
many different ways. A member of a hacktivist group may get into a cyber crime activity. The 
 
7 Igure, "Security Issues in SCADA Networks" p. 500. 
8 Prichard, "Cyber Terrorism: A Study of the Extent of Coverage in Computer Security Textbooks" p. 280. 
same guy may take part in coordinated cyber war or cyber espionage.  
A cyber act can be categorized or perceived as both cyber war and hacktivism. As an example, a 
country can consider a cyber incident as cyber war. On the contrary, another country can 
consider the same act as hacktivism.  
 
Figure 1: Four types of cyber threats 
 
When critical infrastructures are taken into consideration, cyber espionage and cyber war are 
much more harmful than hacktivism and cyber crime. 
2.2.1 Hacktivism 
Hacktivists create opportunistic attacks against weak targets. The power of hacktivists comes 
from their number. Hacktivism is the activity of a group of hackers. The hacker group 
'Anonymous' is a hacktivist group. The main purpose of hacktivists is not to make money. 
Rather, they protest something. For example, they protest the governmental restrictions to the 
Internet and they take aim at the websites of public organizations.  
Hacktivists usually perform Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. A DoS attack can be defined as 
purposefully flooding the bandwidth or resources of a targeted system with a huge number of 
legitimate service requests. Hacktivists usually target the availability of networks and systems by 
performing DoS attacks. In addition to DoS attacks, hacktivists try to deface websites, especially 
websites of public organizations. They do not usually try to deface a specific website for a long 
time. Rather, they search for a specific vulnerability on a number of websites and deface all of 
the websites in their search scope that contain the specific vulnerability. Hacktivist use botnets or 
get contact with the owner of botnets in order to perform Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks to 
guarantee the unavailability of networks and systems.  
2.2.2 Cyber Crime 
By contrast with hacktivists, the main purpose of cyber criminals is to make money. Cyber 
criminals are individuals. Usually, they do not act in groups like hacktivists. They steal credit 
card information, bank account credentials and passwords. The target critical sector for cyber 
criminals is banking and finance. Compared to the other threat types, cyber crime does not have 
a prominent effect on critical infrastructures.  
2.2.3 Cyber Espionage 
Cyber espionage is basically the act of stealing documents from networks of foreign countries 9. 
The loss of confidentiality is the major consequence of cyber espionage. The term Advanced 
Persistent Threat (APT) is used under the context of cyber espionage. According to the 
Mandiant, which is a famous information security company, APT is a group of sophisticated, 
determined and coordinated attackers that have been systematically compromising (U.S.) 
government and commercial computer networks for years. The vast majority of APT activity 
observed by Mandiant has been linked to China.10 
According to the Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, every year, an 
 
9 Lewis, "Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, Cyber War and Other Cyber Threats", p. 9. 
10 Mandiant, M Trends, The Advanced Persistent Threat, p. 1. 
amount of intellectual property larger than that contained in the Library of Congress is stolen 
from networks maintained by U.S. businesses, universities, and government departments and 
agencies. 11  
US - China Economic and Security Review Commission of USA prepared a report to Congress 
in 2008. According to this report, China has an active cyber espionage program. This report says 
that China’s cyber warfare is so sophisticated that the United States may be unable to counteract 
or even detect the efforts.12  
2.2.4 Cyber War 
Cyber war is the coordinated attacks to specific critical sectors of a country. Every critical sector 
is a potential target of cyber war. Most of the cyber security experts think that Stuxnet virus is 
the beginning of real cyber war. Stuxnet was discovered in June 2010. The target of the Stuxnet 
virus was the availability of Iranian nuclear energy infrastructure. According to a New York 
Times report, which was released on 1 January 2012, President Obama secretly ordered 
increasingly sophisticated attacks on the computer systems that run Iran’s main nuclear 
enrichment facilities, significantly expanding America’s first sustained use of cyber weapons, 
according to participants in the program.13 The cyber attacks against the availability of Estonian 
and Georgian websites and network infrastructures are another example of cyber war. Although 
Russia did not undertake those attacks as a government, the coordinated attacks were performed 
by Russian people. The target of cyber war is not only the availability of systems and networks. 
A virus called 'duqu' affected the confidentiality of Iranian energy infrastructure. Duqu was 
discovered after Stuxnet. It is considered that the source of duqu and Stuxnet was the same 
 
11 Department of Defense, Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, p. 4. 
12 US - China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2008 Report to Congress, p. 164. 
13 New York Times, "Middle East Page" at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-
wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html?pagewanted=all (accessed 13 June 2012) 
because of their similarities. Duqu provided services to the attackers; currently this includes 
information stealing capabilities.14 The last discovered malware is called Flame, Flamer or 
Skywiper. According to the New York Times, Flame appears to be part of the state-sponsored 
campaign that spied on and eventually set back Iran’s nuclear program in 2010.15 
2.2.5 Cyber Threats - Final Remarks 
The number of cyber espionage and cyber war activities is low compared to the number of cyber 
crime and hacktivist attacks. When the economic damage and national security is the main 
concern, the impact level of cyber espionage is very high compared to the impact level of other 
threats types.16 Although cyber espionage attacks are low in number, they cause intellectual 
property losses. This has a great value for a country. Although cyber crime activities are large in 
number, the loss is limited to credentials and money. When the public safety is the main concern, 
the impact level of cyber war is high compared to the impact level of other threat types. Cyber 
war can affect the availability of SCADA systems and corporate networks. 
According to the draft Cyber Security Act of 2012, an industry can be defined as “critical” if 
damage or unauthorized access to that system could reasonably  
a) Result in the interruption of life-sustaining services,  
b) Cause catastrophic economic damages or  
c) Cause severe degradation of national security. 17  
By using this damage classification, the prominent effects of the four threat categories on critical 
infrastructures are shown in Table-1. Although there is no crystal-clear classification and 
 
14 Wikipedia, "Duqu article" at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duqu (accessed 13 June 2012) 
15 New York Times, "Technology Page" at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/technology/researchers-link-flame-
virus-to-stuxnet-and-duqu.html (accessed 13 June 2012) 
16 Kshetri, "Patterns of Global Cyber War and Crime: A Conceptual Framework" p. 552. 
17 The Senate of United States, The Draft Cyber Security Act of 2012, http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/the-
cybersecurity-act-of-2012-s-2105 (accessed 13 June 2012)  
correlation between threat types and impact types, Table-1 shares the notion that cyber espionage 
and cyber war are much more harmful than cyber crime and hacktivism.  
THREAT TYPE IMPACT TYPE 
Hacktivism The interruption of life-sustaining services (Minor) 
Cyber Crime Economic damages (Minor) 
Cyber Espionage Economic damages (Major) 
Severe degradation of national security 
Cyber War The interruption of life-sustaining services (Major) 
Economic damages (Intermediate) 
Table 1: Threat categories versus impacts 
  
2.3 Vulnerabilities 
Vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures can be classified into two major groups, which are 
technical vulnerabilities and non-technical vulnerabilities.  
2.3.1 Technical Vulnerabilities 
Technical vulnerabilities are divided into two subgroups; which are basic protocol vulnerabilities 
and application vulnerabilities. Basic protocol vulnerabilities are the vulnerabilities of common 
Internet protocols.18 The core protocols of the Internet such as Internet Protocol (IP), 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), Domain Name System (DNS), Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP) and routing protocols were designed and implemented without focusing on 
security features since the Internet was initially used in academic and governmental 
environments. At these environments, humans were trusted entities. Security countermeasures 
are included in Internet protocols as add-ons after the proliferation and widespread use of the 
 
18 Alcaraz-Tello, "Secure Management of SCADA Networks" p. 23. 
Internet. Therefore, the Internet is vulnerable to basic and competent attacks like denial of 
service, eavesdropping, spoofing and sniffing. Apart from basic protocols, there are a number of 
applications including operating systems that logically run on top of basic protocols. According 
to the IBM X-force report, there is exponential increase in cumulative vulnerability disclosures 
from 1996 to 2010.19 These application vulnerabilities are exploited by attackers to gain access 
privileges to remote systems, to steal information and to stop services. 
2.3.2 Non-technical Vulnerabilities 
In spite of the state-of-the-art security systems, such as digital signatures, cryptography, 
biometric security, stateful firewalls, intrusion prevention systems, access control systems, the 
number of security breaches increases. Even closed networks are infected with targeted worms 
and viruses as in the case of Stuxnet. It is argued by security experts that Stuxnet infected the 
closed energy network of Iran by means of USB thumb drives of the workers of the nuclear 
enrichment facilities. The reason for security breaches is non-technical vulnerabilities. Non-
technical vulnerabilities are related with the people and the processes.20 Unfortunately, the 
weakest link for security is the human being. As an example, in November 2008, US-CERT 
issued a warning that malicious code was increasingly propagating via USB flash drive devices. 
The fact that USB thumb drives are being used by so many people makes them an attractive 
target for malware writers.21 In those days, US Department of Defense has temporarily banned 
the use of thumb drives, CDs and other removable storage.22 Although, technical 
countermeasures are vital for the security of critical infrastructures, it will not be as effective as 
expected without improvements in the behavior of people and security processes.  
 
19 IBM X-force, 2010 Trend and Risk Report, p. 75. 
20Stouffer, "Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security", p. 3-7.  
21 CNET, News Site at http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-10104496-83.html (accessed 13 June 2012) 
22 Wired, website at http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/11/army-bans-usb-d (accessed 13 June 2012) 
2.3.3 Vulnerabilities - Final Remarks 
Certain threat types exploit certain vulnerabilities as shown in Table-2. Although it is not a 
golden rule, hacktivists generally exploit basic protocols at first, and then application 
vulnerabilities. Cyber criminals usually exploit application vulnerabilities. Cyber warriors use 
application and infrastructure vulnerabilities like hacktivists. Finally, cyber spies exploit people 
and process vulnerabilities. 
THREAT TYPE EXPLOITED VULNERABILITY TYPE 
Hacktivism Basic Protocol Vulnerabilities 
Application Vulnerabilities 
Cyber Crime Application Vulnerabilities 
Cyber Espionage Non-technical Vulnerabilities 
Application Vulnerabilities 
Cyber War Application Vulnerabilities 
Basic Protocol Vulnerabilities 
Table 2: Threat categories versus vulnerabilities 
2.4 Countermeasures 
Most of the vulnerabilities can be patched by using simple technical preventive countermeasures. 
There will still be a considerable amount of risk after applying preventive countermeasures. 
Corrective countermeasures should be used in order to minimize the risk amount. Even if all of 
the preventive and corrective countermeasures are applied, there will be some minor residual 
risk. Hundred percent security is not possible in the real world. There is no technology and 
budget that eliminates the risk totally. The residual risks generally originate from the 
vulnerabilities of people and processes. The cyber espionage teams and spies usually use these 
vulnerabilities in order to steal information.  
Countermeasures can also be divided into two main categories, which are technical 
countermeasures and non-technical countermeasures.  
2.4.1 Technical Countermeasures 
Patching the systems against vulnerabilities and implementing the latest technical security 
measures are the most prominent technical countermeasures. Security test and audits should be 
performed periodically. Active cyber security teams that are working for governments should 
gather cyber intelligence. Based on this cyber intelligence, predictions should be made and 
preventive actions should be taken. Also, research and development facilities should be 
supported by governments. The security for SCADA networks is a new and extremely important 
subject. Security must be a design issue for SCADA systems; it should not be an add-on. 
Certified software and hardware usage should be prioritized.23 Both technical and policy based 
access control mechanisms should be used.24 
2.4.2 Non-technical Countermeasures 
There are two important non-technical countermeasures, which are awareness and cooperation. 
The most effective countermeasure for people vulnerabilities is security awareness. Security 
awareness is a vital countermeasure for not only computer users. Everyone whether computer 
user or not in an organization should be the target of security awareness programs.  
Security is a matter of coordination, cooperation, collaboration and communication. In 2009, a 
Department of Homeland Security official said that hackers are better organized than 
governments.25 
For all the types of threats that are stated in this paper, cooperation is a vital countermeasure. For 
 
23 Miller, "Trends in Process Control Systems Security", p. 58. 
24 Kilman, "Framework for SCADA Security Policy", p. 4. 
25Packetstormsecurity, website at http://packetstormsecurity.org/news/view/16185/Testimony-Hackers-Better-
Organized-Than-Government.html (accessed 13 June 2012) 
all four threat categories, the possible cooperation instances are shown in Table-3. For a 
government, cooperation with critical infrastructure operators and owners is an essential and 
imperative countermeasure. Cooperation with Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Computer 
Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) is a significant countermeasure against hacktivist attacks. 
Cooperation with police and law enforcement agencies is essential in order to combat cyber 
crime. Cooperation with CERTs and other countries are crucial in order to deal with cyber war. 
Cooperation with employees and cutting-edge technology makers is an indispensable 
countermeasure against cyber espionage.  
THREAT TYPE COOPERATION WITH ... 
Hacktivism Cooperation with ISPs 
Cooperation with CERTs 
Cooperation with infrastructure operators and owners 
Cyber Crime Cooperation with police 
Cooperation with law enforcement agencies 
Cooperation with infrastructure operators and owners 
Cyber Espionage Cooperation with employees 
Cooperation with technology developers 
Cooperation with infrastructure operators and owners 
Cyber War Cooperation with CERTs, ISPs 
International cooperation 
Cooperation with infrastructure operators and owners 
Table 3: Threat categories versus sides of cooperation  
 
2.4.3 Countermeasures - Final Remarks 
Countermeasures are imperative in order to deal with cyber risks and to ensure an acceptable 
level of critical infrastructure protection. The application of all types of countermeasures should 
be considered as a life-cycle process. Once a countermeasure is applied, the effectiveness of the 
countermeasure should be measured continuously. The application and effectiveness of 
countermeasures should be monitored and improved as necessary. In Table-4, prominent 
countermeasures are listed for each threat category. Cooperation and technical countermeasures 
should be applied for all types of threats. Although security awareness is also applicable in order 
to deal with all threat types, it is especially important to counteract cyber espionage. 
THREAT TYPE COUNTERMEASURE 
Hacktivism Cooperation 
Technical Countermeasures 
Cyber Crime Cooperation 
Technical Countermeasures 
Cyber Espionage Cooperation 
Security Awareness 
Technical Countermeasures 
Cyber War Cooperation 
Technical Countermeasures 
Table 4: Threat categories versus countermeasure types 
 
3. Conclusion 
Today, cyber systems serve as key infrastructures for critical sectors. Almost all sectors use 
information technologies for automating their core business processes. Automated business 
processes are connected to the Internet and corporate networks for optimization and decreasing 
costs. Cyber systems of critical infrastructures are among the attractive targets of cyber threats. 
There are different types of threats with different motivations, qualifications and capacities. All 
of these threats exploit certain vulnerabilities of cyber systems of critical infrastructures. 
Therefore vulnerabilities have to be mitigated in order to cope with threats. There are different 
types of countermeasures in order to mitigate the vulnerabilities. The impact level and diversity 
of cyber threats will increase steadily in parallel with the widespread use of cyber systems. 
Therefore, critical infrastructure protection will be one of the most important agenda items of all 
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